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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a decision of the Third Judicial 
District Court that affirmed an administrative action which had 
ostensibly adjudicated Appellant's so-called "support debt" and 
attendant obligation to reimburse the Utah State Department of 
Social Services for payments made by the Department to Appellant's 
former wife (Co-Respondent) as support for the parties' child. 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
Since the Appellant in the present proceeding was designated 
as "Defendant" in the administrative proceedings and since the 
Respondents herein were designated "Plaintiffs" in that hearing, 
-this Brief will endeavor to avoid convusion by designating the 
parties as follows: Appellant shall be referred to as "Craig," 
"Craig Knudson" or "Appellant." Respondent, Utah State Department 
of Social Services, shall be referred to as the "Department," 
S · 1 S . " "R nd t " "Department of ocia ervices or espo en . Respondent, 
-1-
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Goldie Knudson, shall be referred to as "Goldie," "Goldie 
Knudson" or "Co-Respondent." 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Brief of Respondents disagrees (Resp. B. 2 to 4) with 
several of the facts enumerated in the Brief of Appellant. However, 
in their Brief on Judicial Review of Administrative Order (R.143) 
Respondents stated that they concurred with Appellant's statement 
of the facts in Appellant's Brief on Judicial Review of Administra-
tive Action (R.3 to 9) with the exception that Respondents challengec 
the fact that the Department of Social Services had received 
actual notice regarding the monetary arrangements between Craig 
and Goldie Knudson and denied that the Department had acquiesced 
to any such agreement. It was on these facts that the Court below 
rendered its decision. A perusal of the statement of the facts 
in the Brief of Appellant (App. B. 2 to 9) will demonstrate that 
the facts recited therein, including the summary of those facts, 
are virtually identical to those contained in Appellant's Brief 
on Judicial Review of Administrative Order. It is these facts 
which are to be reviewed by this Court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding, upheld the Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge without comment concerning his ratio 
decedendi (R.173). No argument had been heard (R.169, 173). 
-2-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of the Third 
Judicial District Court and of that portion of the· administrative 
Memorandum and Order which denies recognition to the reasonable 
rental value of the housing and other benefits provided by 
Appellant for his family during the period in question and 
which thereby adjudicates Appellant's putative "support debt" 
in derogation of the facts and circumstances of the case. 
Appellant seeks a decision and Order from the Court determining 
that he has no obligation to make reimbursement to the Depart-
ment in this proceeding. Appellant further seeks an award of his 
attorneys' fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DEPARTMENT IS BARRED FROM 
RECOVERING REIMBURSEMENT FROM APPELLANT 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
As was diligently demonstrated in the Brief of Appellant, 
the instant case is governed by this Court's ruling in Mecham v. 
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977). 
The Court in Mecham held: 
"As to reimbursement for the support furnished to 
Maxine Mecham, the Department's rights are deriva-
tive and no greater than Maxine's rights. In her 
complaint, Maxine pleaded for temporary alimony. 
In the decree, she was denied past and present 
alimony; defendant's duty of support was determined, 
and the matter is res judicata. The Department 
cannot file a complaint one year after a court has 
determined the amount of support (in this case 
nothing), and demand reimbursement under Chapter 45. 
_f'.:l_ 
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The same principle applies to child support which 
accumulated prior to the date of the [divorce] 
decree e • • Maxine had pleaded in her complaint 
for temporary child support; there was no provision 
in the decree for any sum expended for support of 
the child [during the pendency of the divorce ac-
tion] . . . Maxine also had a duty to support the 
child, Section 78-45-4. Under the decree she was 
ordered to assume and pay any and all debts she had 
incurred since the filing of the complaint and to 
hold her husband harmless. Maxine did not seek in 
the decree any sum for reimbursement for the money 
she had expended for support of the child, although 
she had put that matter at issue in her pleadings. 
The rights of the Department are derived through 
Maxine -- the matter is res judicata." Mecham vs. 
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah 1977) (emphasis 
added). 
Subsequently, this Court reaffirmed Mecham's cogency under facts 
similar to those in the instant case by holding: 
"Mecham does not prevent the State from ever obtaining 
reimbursement for sums expended by the state prior to 
a court decree. Rather, it merely holds that the State's 
right to reimbursement is derivative from the person en-
titled to support and is limited to the amount of support 
fixed by the Court. Because the district court assessed 
no child support payments against the defendant until 
after the effective date of the decree, the State was not 
entitled to reimbursement for those sums expended upon 
the child before the decree." Roberts vs. Roberts, 529 
P.2d 597, 599 (Utah 1979). 
In the instant case, as in Mecham, the Department of Social 
Services is seeking to obtain reimbursement for funds given to 
the Department's co-respondent -- in Mecham, Maxine Mecham; and 
in the instant case, Goldie Knudson -- as "support" for each co-
respondent's child during the pendency of such co-respondent's 
divorce proceeding. In Mecham (Mecham vs. Mecham, Case No. 14910, 
Resp. B. 6 and Appendix A to this Reply Brief) as well as in the 
instant case (R.62) an assignment of the co-respondent's right to 
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child support was executed in favor of the Department of Social 
Services by each co-respondent. In Mecham the wife filed a complaint 
for divorce; in that complaint she sought temporary alimony and 
child support; after first scheduling the divorce case for an ad-
versary hearing, the parties presented a stipulation to the court 
with the result that the divorce was handled on a default basis; 
the record of the divorce proceeding does not indicate that Maxine 
Mecham pursued her demand for temporary alimony or support; and, 
with respect to child support, the divorce decree merely ordered 
the husband to pay Maxine Mecham $75.00 per month as child support. 
Mecham vs. Mecham, supra at 124, R.16, 19, 23, Exhibit ''A'' to 
Resp. B. In the instant case the wife filed a complaint for divorce; 
she thereafter filed a motion for her husband to show cause why 
he should not be required to pay her temporary alimony and child 
support during the pendency of the divorce proceedings (Appendix 
B to App. B.); this order was accompanied by a supporting affidavit 
of Goldie Knudson; the record does not indicate that she pursued 
her demand for temporary alimony or support; although the divorce 
was originally scheduled for an adversary hearing, the parties in 
court agreed to an oral stipulation with the result that the 
divorce proceeded on a default basis; and the divorce decree merely 
awarded Goldie child support in the amount of $150.00 per month, 
making no mention of temporary alimony or support (R.66, 67, 68, 
76' 77). In neither Mecham nor the instant case did the Department 
of Social Services intervene in the divorce proceedings (R.66 to 74, 
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Mecham vs. Mecham, Case No. 14910, App. B. 3). Mecham and the 
instant case are, thus, factually indistinguishable. 
This Court's theory and declaration that divorce decrees such 
as those in Mecham and the instant case should be res judicata 
against the Department of Social Services in any proceeding sub-
sequent to the divorce for the purpose of obtaining reimbursement 
of sums expended by the Department for the support of the parties' 
child during the pendency of the divorce proceedings has been, 
again as carefully discussed in the Brief of Appellant, bolstered 
by the statute requiring any support obligee who files an action 
to recover support to give notice to the Department of Social 
Services of such action, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-9(2) (1953); the 
statute declaring that any court order embodying a money judgment 
for support to be paid to a support obligee by any person shall 
be deemed to be in favor of the Department of Social Services to 
the extent of the Department's subrogation rights, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45b-3(5) (1953); and the statute providing that the Department 
shall have the right to petition· a court for modification of any 
court order on the same basis as a party to that action would have 
been able to do, Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-3(6) (1953). 
However, rather than pursuing Goldie for the breach of her 
duty to notify the Department of Social Services of her divorce 
action or attempting in a timely fashion -- a possibility whict 
no longer exists -- to have the Knudsons' divorce decree modified, 
the Department has relentlessly stalked Craig. Continuing this 
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eternal quest, they now suggest, implicitly, that this Court over-
rule its decision in Mecham or, explicitly, that this Court find 
some distinction between Mecham and the virtually identical instant 
case. 
Yet, the reasoning underlying the decision in Mecham is 
sound. The holding in that case is merely a practical application 
of the test established by this Court in Krofcheck vs. Downey 
State Bank, 580 P.2d 243, 244 (Utah 1978), for the imposition of the 
doctrine of res judicata: 
(1) the two cases must be between the same parties or 
their privies; 
(2) there must have been a final judgment on the merits 
of the prior case; and 
(3) the prior adjudication must have involved the same 
issue or an issue that could or should have been raised therein. 
Respondents, appropriately, have agreed that the foregoing is the 
proper test to determine when the doctrine of res judicata should 
be applied (Resp. B. 5). 
An opinion by the United States Supreme Court, furthermore, 
demonstrates the correctness of the test which this Court has 
established. In Allen vs. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (em-
phasis added), the Supreme Court declared, "under res judicata, 
a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties 
or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have 
been raised in that action.'' This Court implicitly approved the 
7 
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test it had established for determining when to apply the doctrine 
of res judicata and defined "privity" in Searle Brothers vs. Searle. 
588 P.2d 689, 690-691 (Utah 1978): 
"The legal definition of a person in privity with another, 
is a person so identified in interest with another that he 
represents the same legal right. This includes a mutual 
or successive relationship to rights in property." 
In several subsequent cases this Court has reaffirmed the concept 
that res judicata applies not only to issues which were actually 
litigated in the prior proceeding but, also, to those that could 
or should have been: International Resources vs. Dunfield, 599 
P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1979), Mendenhall vs. Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287, 
1289 (Utah 1980), Bradshaw vs. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528~ 531 (Utah, 
19 81). 
Respondents agree that the divorce decree in the instant case 
constituted a final judgment on the merits of that case (Resp. B. 
5); Respondents, however, deny that the other two parts of the 
test established in Krofcheck have been met. But the interest held 
by the Department of Social Services in the instant case falls 
precisely within the definition of "privity" enunciated by this 
Court in Searle: the Department succeeded to an interest, i.e., 
a claim for child support, formerly held by Goldie Knudson. Again 
as this Court noted in Mecham vs. Mecham, 570 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah 
1977), 
"As to reimbursement .for the support furnished to Maxine 
Mecham, the Department's rights are derivitive and no 
greater than Maxine's rights . . . . The rights of the 
Department are derived through Maxine . . . . ., 
In both Mecham and the instant case the wife had assigned her claim 
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for child support to the Deparment of Social Services. The Depart-
ment, th~refore, was in privity with the wife in each case not only 
because of applicable support law, Utah Code Ann. §§78-45-9, 78-
45b-3 (1953), but also because of a written assignment of rights 
to the Department (R.62, Appendix A to App. Reply B., Mecham vs. 
Mecham, Case No. 14910, Resp. B. 6, R.33). Despite the Department's 
attempt at legalistic alchemy, any rights it has -- whether statu-
tory or contractual -- are derived through Goldie Knudson; if she 
has no right to support payments for her child, the Department 
has none. Yet, even if the preceding analysis did not establish 
that the Department was in privity with a party to the divorce 
proceeding in the instant case, the Department would still be 
in privity; for both Goldie and the Department, in requesting 
that Craig be forced to make payments for child support, are acting 
as fiduciaries or guardians for the child of Craig and Goldie 
Knudson. It is the right of this child to support that was 
established by the divorce decree; it is the right of this child 
that the Department subsequently sought to enforce against Craig 
by an administrative proceeding. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
17(a) (emphasis added) declares: 
''Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest. An executor, administrator, 
guardian, ... or a party authorized by statute may 
sue in his own name without joining with him the party 
for whose benefit the action is brought ... 
When an inf ant or an insane or incompetent person is 
a party, he must appear either by his general guardian, 
or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular 
-9-
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case by the court in which the action is pending." 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b). 
Section 78-45b-l.l of the Public Support of Children Act says, in 
part, "it is declared to be the public policy of this state ... 
that children shall be maintained from the resources of responsible 
t " paren s . . . . Both the foregoing quotation and the very title 
of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§78-45-1 to 78-45-13 (1953), indicate that the purpose of any 
action undertaken by the State of Utah to enforce an obligation 
owed to a support obligee, in this case the child of Craig and 
Goldie Knudson, is to protect the rights of that obligee, not 
the rights of the Department of Social Services. 
Respondents further argue (Resp. B. 5) that the remaining 
portion of the test enunciated in Krofcheck, i.e., that the prior 
adjudication must have involved the same issue or an issue that 
could or should have been raised therein, has not been satisfied 
in the instant case. Yet, as noted above, both Maxine Mecham 
and Goldie Knudson requested child support during the pendency 
of their divorce proceedings. Maxine Mecham made her request in 
her complaint; Goldie Knudson, in an order to show cause (Appendix 
B to App. Reply B.). Additionally, Goldie Knudson filed an 
affidavit (R.75 to 77) to prove that she was entitled to child 
support during the pendency of her divorce proceedings. Again 
as noted above, the divorce decrees in both Mecham and the instant 
case merely provided a sum certain for child support, without 
explicitly referring to past support during the pendency of the 
., I"\ 
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divorce proceedings. Only such an explicit declaration, either in 
Mecham or the instant case, could have made it more clear that 
the issue of child support during the pendency of the divorce 
proceedings not only could have been, but was actually, litigated. 
Respondents were well aware of these facts; indeed, the very ad-
ministrative order which is at issue in the instant case was 
purportedly based, in part, on that same affidavit (R.86). 
Even though it is clear from the fact that Craig Knudson 
was a party to the divorce proceedings in this case and that the 
Department of Social Services is in privity with Goldie Knudson 
or the child of Craig and Goldie Knudson, who was or were parties 
to the divorce proceeding, that the applicable doctrine to the 
instant case is res judicata, respondents challenge application 
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel -- a doctrine which applies 
when only the side against which a prior judicial ruling is 
sought to be applied was a party to the preceding judicial pro-
cess. 
Of course, had Craig not been a party to the divorce pro-
ceedings in this case, he would be forced to rely upon the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel. This Court has established 
the test which must be met for the imposition of collateral 
estoppel in Searle Brothers vs. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 
1978), and Wilde vs. Mid-Century Insurance Company, 635 P.2d 
417, 419 (Utah 1981): 
(1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
, , 
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identical with the one presented in the action in question? 
(2) Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
( 3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? 
(4) Was the issue in the first case competently, fully 
and fairly litigated? 
Although the discussion of res judicata, above, is sufficient 
to demonstrate that were it necessary, Craig could satisfy all 
these tests for the application of collateral estoppel, Respondents 
assert that the case of Ruffinengo vs. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 
1978), shows that the Department of Social Services cannot be 
bound by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In Ruffinengo at 
343 the Court stated, "As to the matter of collateral estoppel, 
it is to be noted that Reffinengo was not a party nor in privity 
with a party in the prior suit .... " (emphasis added). Ruffin-
engo, however, merely had rights that were identical to a party 
in the prior suit; no showing had been made that his rights 
succeeded from· .a party to that prior suit, as required by the 
definition of "privity" given in Searle, supra, and as did the 
Department's rights from Goldie. 
This Court in Ruffinengo cited an opinion of the Unitea 
States Supreme Court, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. vs. 
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971): 
"Some litigants -- those who never appeared in a prior 
action -- may not be collaterally estopped without 
litigating the issue." 
- , .· -
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In a subsequent opinion the Supreme Court clarified this statement: 
"[W]hile the general rule is that nonparties to the 
first action are not bound by a judgment or result-
ing determination of issues, see Blonder-Tongue vs. 
University Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320-327 (1971), 
several exceptions exist. The pertinent exception 
here is that nonparties may be collaterally estopped 
from relitigating issues necessarily decided in a 
suit brought by a party who acts as a fiduciary 
representative for the beneficial interest of the 
nonparties." Sea-Land Services, Inc. vs. Gaudet, 
414 U.S. 573, 593 (1974). 
The Supreme Court, thus, using the language of "exceptions" indi-
cates that the same type of analysis that we used in determining 
whether one is in "privity," as defined by Searle, is to be under-
taken in order to determine whether an individual or organization 
that was not an actual party to a preceding judicial decision can 
be bound by that decision. It is particularly instructive to 
note that the Supreme Court determined that collateral estoppel 
should be applied to one who acted "as a fiduciary representative 
for the beneficial interest of the nonparties," (emphasis added), 
as in the instant case did Goldie for her child and, derivatively, 
for the Department of Social Services. 
Taking another tack, Respondents again assert their erroneous 
proposition that Mecham did not involve a situation where the 
wife who sought child support in the divorce proceedings had 
previously executed an assignment to the Department of Social 
Services. Respondents then claim that this Court ruled in Inter-
national Resources vs. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979), "that 
the doctrine of res judicata does not bar an assignor from 
-13-
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maintaining an action against a debtor, even though the asignee 
had brought a prior action.'' In fact, this Court declared on 
page 517 of International Resources that there had been no demon-
stration in that case that any assignment did exist. In Lynch 
vs. MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464, 468 (Utah 1962) (emphasis added), 
this Court said, "the general rule is that an assignee is the 
real party in interest." But this does not mean that the assignor 
is not a real party in interest. A number of cases indicate 
various situations in which an assignor of an interest is per-
mitted to bring suit. 
The court in Harambee Enterprises, Inc. vs. State Board of 
Agriculture, 511 P.2d 503, 504 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973), stated, 
"If an assignor has not assigned his entire claim, 
he can still maintain an action in his own name." 
In Warren vs. Kirwan, 598 S.W.2d 598, 600-601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), 
the court was considering an assignment which read, "the Insured 
hereby assigns . . . to the Insurer any and all claims or causes 
of action e • • to the extent of the payment above made . " . . . 
The court construed this language, which is remarkably similar 
to the language in the assignment of Goldie Knudson on behalf of 
the Department of Social Services (R.62), to be a partial assign-
ment and, therefore, to permit suit by the assignor. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Hoeppner Construc-
tion Company, Inc. vs. United States, 287 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1960), 
also ruled that an assignor who has not assigned his entire claim 
can maintain an action in his own name. 
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The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Dereschuk vs. Knudsen, 
280 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 1979), citing cases from several other 
jurisdictions, held that the assignor in cases where the assign-
ment is for collection only or is given as a mere collateral 
security is certainly a party in interest. 
In Cantor vs. Union Mutual Life Insurance Company, 547 S.W.2d 
220, 225-226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977), another assignment was construed 
by the court. This assignment was of "all my right, title and 
interest in said Policy and in and to any and all benfits which 
may hereafter become payable . . . " The court found this to 
be an assignment given as collateral security because additional 
language in the assignment stated that it was to be "collateral 
security for any and all of my present or future indebtedness 
to the Assignee." According to the court, 
"[W]here an assignment is given as collateral security 
only, the assignor retains such an enforceable sub-
stantive right so as to maintain an action, even though 
the assignment appears to be absolute in form . 
When the assignor maintains suit, the assignee is a 
'necessary' party ... and not an 'indispensable' one." 
In C & M Developers, Inc. vs. Berbiglia, 585 S.W.2d 176, 181 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979), another district of the Missouri Court of 
Appeals agreed with the holding in Cantor. 
Reviewing the assignment in the instant case (R.62), it is 
evident that this assignment fits all of the foregoing categories: 
it is a partial assignment because it assigns the right to collect 
for child support only to the extent that funds had been pro-
vided by the Department of Social Services to Goldie on behalf 
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of her child, it is an assignment for collection only because its 
purpose was to facilitate the Department's efforts to obtain re-
imbursement for "child support" from Craig, and it is an assign-
ment furnished for collateral security by Goldie to guarantee to 
the Department that they would be able to obtain the funds they 
desired from Craig. 
Yet, even if the assignment in the instant case could not 
be classified into any of the categories which have just been 
considered, Goldie would have been entitled to maintain an action 
in her own name on behalf of her child in accordance with Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b). As noted in detail above, the 
principal purpose of the assignment and of the relevant support 
laws of the State of Utah is to ensure that children will receive 
the necessities of life; and such children are, therefore, truly 
the real parties in interest in any action instituted for child 
support, whether it be by the custodial parent of that child or 
by the Department of Social Services. This Court long ago declared 
that it would look behind the pronouncements on the face of an 
assignment to determine its true purpose. In Nelson vs. Smith, 
154 P.2d 634, 637-639 (Utah 1944), the Court observed that in 
view of Article I Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah, no 
per~on could be barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
state tribunal by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he was a party. The court then also noted that an assignee has 
the right, in accordance with the Constitution of Utah, to appear 
-16-
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in court and prosecute or defend an interest which has been 
assigned to him. But, considering the true purpose of the assign-
ment as opposed to its superficial declarations, the court announced 
that laymen would not be permitted to evade or circumvent the 
statute that required lawyers to be licensed by the State through 
the device of taking an assignment of the claim and proceeding in 
their own names. 
A declaration that Goldie after executing the assignment to 
the Department of Social Services no longer had the right to 
utilize the legal process to protect the interest of her child 
would, furthermore, contravene the spirit of the opinion rendered 
by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky vs. Kramer, 71 
L.Ed.2d 599, 603 (1982): 
"Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably 
the rights of parents in their natural child, due 
process requires that the State support its allega-
tions by at least clear and convincing evidence." 
And should this Court hold that because of the assignment 
from Goldie to the Department of Social Services, the Department 
may proceed to enforce that assignment and collect reimbursement 
for "child support" from Craig in spite of the divorce decree, 
the Department of Social Services would have a veto over the 
judicial system of this State. When a divorce decree would not 
be favorable to the Department, the Department would proceed 
under its assignment from the custodial parent and ignore the 
judicial decree; when a divorce decree would appear pleasing 
to the Department, the Department would proceed under its 
-17-
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statutory right to enforce that decree. 
I I. 
VIOLATIONS OF APPELLANT'S STATUTORY AND 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY THE DEPARTMENT 
SHOULD, AT LEAST, CAUSE THIS CASE TO BE 
REMANDED FOR A FULL AND FAIR HEARING. 
Perhaps, the most striking feature of the instant case is 
the fact that there has never been any adjudication declaring that 
Craig Knudson had failed in his duty to support his child. In 
fact, the divorce decree ruled, sub silentio, that Craig had 
satisfied all duties of support to his child during the pendency 
of the divorce proceedings. 
In State Division of Family Services vs. Clark, 554 P.2d 
1310, 1311-1312 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added), this Court declared: 
"A necessary concomitant of the continuing and in-
alienable duty of parents to support their children 
is that if a child is left in need and a third party 
comes to the rescue and furnishes support~ the latter 
is subrogated to the child's right and may obtain 
reimbursement therefor . . . . The purpose is to 
assist in assuring that help will not be withheld 
from children in necessitous circumstances. Never-
theless they should be furnished only those things 
which are reasonable and necessary, and this may 
sometimes vary according to the appropriate standard 
of living . . . . 
On pages 20 through 27 of the Brief of Appellant in the 
instant case, a thorough discussion has been presented of the 
specific statutes in the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§78-45-1 to 78-45-13 (1953), which designate 
the factors to be considered and the procedural methods to be 
utilied in determining the "reasonable and necessary" support 
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that a parent is required to furnish his child. Such statutory 
sections make provision for hearings when there is no prior 
judicial decree adjudicating the support obligation and, also, 
for proceedings when there is a prior judicial decree specifying 
the support that the parent or support obliger is required to 
furnish. These statutes indicate that the only course available 
to the Department of Social Services when it desires to alter a 
divorce decree which has explicitly or implicitly declared that 
the support obligor has satisfied all duties of support prior 
to the time such decree was entered is to seek a modification 
of that decree, "on the same basis as a party to that action 
would have been able to do . " Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-3(6) . . . 
(1953). But the time period within which Goldie and, therefore, 
the Department of Social Services could have properly sought a 
modification of the divorce decree in the instant case with 
respect to child support during the pendency of the divorce 
proceedings has long since expired. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2) (1953) (emphasis added) declares 
"(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material 
change in circumstances has occurred, the court in 
determining the amount of prospective support shall 
consider all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: (a) The standard of living and situation of 
the parties; (b) The relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) The ability of the obliger to earn; 
(d) The ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) The need of the obligee; 
(f) The age of the parties; 
(g) The responsibility of the obliger for support 
of others." 
-19-
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This Court in Roberts vs. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597, 599 (Utah 1979) 
(emphasis added), raised the requirement that such factors be 
considered in determining the duty of a support obligor to Con-
stitutional levels: 
"[It] would constitute a denial of due process to the 
obligor's spouse if the court assessed the obligor for 
all public assistance payments received by the obligee, 
without considering relevant factors such as the rela-
tive wealth and income of the parties; and the ability 
of the parties to earn income. Under [section] 78-45-
7(2) seven such factors are required to be considered 
in determining the amount of prospective support. Under 
the Public Support of Children Act [78-45b-6(2)], 
which provides an administrative procedure for obtain-
ing reimbursement for assistance payments made on behalf 
of minor children, similar factors must be considered 
in the hearing to determine the extent of the parent's 
liability for child support [footnote omitted]. The 
assessment of arrearages under [section] 78-45-7(3) 
must also be subject to consideration of the same 
factors." (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, even were Respondent's dubious assertion that because the 
instant case involves an assignment, Respondent could proceed 
to determine the support obligation by any method (Resp. B. 13), 
true, the Department would still be required to consider, among 
other factors, those prescribed in Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2) 
(1953). 
In its administrative hearing, the Department provided no 
evidence whatsoever bearing upon the standard of living and 
situation of the parties, the relative wealth and income of the 
parties, the ability of the obliger to earn a living, the ablity 
of the obligee to earn a living, the need of the obligee, the 
age of the parties, or the possible responsibility of the obligor 
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for the support of others. Indeed, the Department rested its 
case after showing only the amount of the support payments made 
to Goldie during the period in question. No effort was made 
to assess all or even to consider most of the other factors 
required for a proper determination of the support obligation of 
Appellant under the statute. Clearly, the Department had the 
burden of proof on this issue. The minimal facts that were 
presented relative to these considerations were produced by 
Appellant. This modicum of evidence consisted of Appellant's 
testimony that during the period for which the Department seeks 
reimbursement, Appellant was employed by LaBelle's as an audio 
manager (R.A3); that from 1973 through 1975, inclusive, Goldie 
earned approximately $6,000 per year (R.45); that from 1975 
through 1978 Goldie had no earnings (R.45); that after leaving 
Appellant, Goldie requested that Appellant pay $200 each month 
as child support (R.45); that Appellant had then declared he 
could not afford to pay such support (R.46); and that Goldie 
worked during 1979 as a CETA summer work program bookkeeper 
(R.51). Appellant also introduced a certified copy of the 
divorce decree (R.66-68), the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in the divorce proceeding (E.69-74), and the affidavit 
Goldie had used in an attempt to get support during the pendency 
of the divorce proceeding (R.75-77). 
In her order the Administrative Law Judge merely considered 
the fact that the Department of Social Services had provided 
-21-
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support to Craig and Goldie Knudson's child during the pendency 
of the divorce proceedings, the divorce decree, the affidavit 
submitted by Goldie during the divorce proceedings, and the rental 
payments made by Craig for the lot upon which the mobile home 
that Goldie and the Knudson's child used as a residence during 
the pendency of the divorce proceedings was situated (R.84 to 87). 
It is, to say the least, intriguing that Respondents suggest that 
they satisfied the demands of Roberts (Resp. B. 13 to 15) by utilizi 
the affidavit and divorce decree which they argue would not 
meet the test for collateral estoppel, were collateral estoppel 
rather than res judicata the appropriate doctrine to apply to 
the facts of the instant case. 
III. 
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE PRECLUDE 
THE DEPARTMENT FROM RECOVERING REIMBURSEMENT 
FROM APPELLANT. 
~ven were the doctrine of res judicata not applicable to 
the instant case and had Respondents considered the required 
factors in determining the support obligation, Respondents 
should have given Craig credit for the necessities which he 
provided to Goldie and the Knudson's child during the pendency 
of the divorce proceedings. Appellants have already elaborately 
detailed the legal, Constitutional and factual reasons why such 
credit should have been extended (App. B. 27 to 35). Thus, only 
a few points need be mentioned here. 
Before a marriage is terminated, the 
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breadwinners in the family provide necessities for their children; 
they do not necessarily supply the other spouse solely with cash 
payments so that the other spouse may purchase necessities for 
their children. And the support statutes considered above speak 
in terms of supplying the support obligee with the necessities 
of life -- not with cash. This is why respondents could not find 
any cases requiring that support payments prior to the entry of 
a divorce decree be made in cash (Resp. B. 16). 
Moreover, during the emotional turmoil of divorce proceedings, 
the noncustodial spouse may very well furnish necessities rather 
than cash to the other spouse on behalf of their child because the 
noncustodial spouse, at such a time, may entertain doubts con-
cerning the responsibility of the custodial spouse. 
As demonstrated by this Court's opinion in Ross vs. Ross, 
592 P.2d 600, 603 (Utah 1979), a principal reason 
why payments-in-kind are not permitted to satisfy a judicial 
decree when they are made after such decree has been entered is 
that permitting such an extra-judicial "modification" of the 
decree would necessarily lessen respect for the judicial system 
a result which could not transpire before any decree had been 
entered. Furthermore, respondent's theory that credit is not 
given for payments·-in-kind made after the entry of a. judicial 
decree because "the intent of child support is to allow the 
custodial parents latitude in deciding the needs of the child 
and not permit the noncustodial parent to dictate where the 
-23-
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monies are to be expended" (Resp. B. 16) need be of no concern 
in the instant case because Goldie, the custodial parent, chose 
to return to the housing which Craig supplied (R.44, 46) and for 
which Craig requests credit. 
And even if the instant case involved payments-in-kind sub-
sequent to the entry of a judicial decree requiring payments in 
cash, this Court has recognized that there should be "equitable 
exceptions" to the rule that all such post-decree payments must 
be in cash. Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 42 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1935) 
(dictum). Then in the post-decree case of Ross vs. Ross, supra 
at 603-604, this Court announced, 
"Only if the defendant has consented to the plaintiff's 
voluntary expenditures as an alternative manner of 
satisfying his alimony and child support obligations, 
can plaintiff receive credit for such expenditures." 
The instant case did, indeed, involve such an agreement (R.46). 
In a highly relevant case closely related to the instant 
situation a Colorado court has ruled that child support accruing 
during a period when a divorced husband and wife were in good 
faith attempting a reconciliation should be abated. In re 
Peterson, 572 P.2d 849 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). 
Appellants have demonstrated in detail that under any 
financially reasonable ~ystem of accounting the benefits pro-
vided by Craig to Gol.:.. ·,.~ and the Knudson's child during the 
pendency of the divorce proceedings and for which Criig has 
received no credit substantially exceed the amount che Depart-
ment claims it deserves as reimbursement for "child support.'' 
-24-
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The Department of Social Services would have long ago given Craig 
credit for such benefits were it more concerned with rendering 
due process to the citizens of this state than with its own ego-
centric desire for administrative convenience. 
CONCLUSION 
Craig is not trying to avoid his duty to support his child; 
he is simply attempting to have recognition given to a prior 
judicial determination of what that duty is, to have the proper 
factors considered in determining that duty, and to receive 
credit for the support he has provided his child. 
Therefore, the decisions of the Third Judicial District 
Court and the Administrative Law Judge should be reversed; this 
Court should declare that Appellant owes nothing to the Depart-
ment for child support during the pendency of the divorce action. 
If this is not done, the Court should, at least, remand the case 
so that the statutorily required factual determinations can be 
made. And, in view of the egregiously bad faith exhibited by the 
Department in pursuing Appellant, with full knowledge of the 
prior divorce decree, contrary to the clear dictates of due 
process, relevant statutes, and controlling case law, this Court 
should, in all equity and good conscience, award Appellant his 
attorney's fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of August, 1982. 
JENSEN & LLOYD 
Thompson E. Fehr 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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Address of Attorney: 
870 Commercial Security Bank Tower 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0457 
Telephone: (801) 322-2300 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY DELIVERY 
I, the unde.rsigned, do hereby certify that I have this 
day personally served a true and accurate· copy of the foregoing 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel of record for the 
Defendants and Respondents by hand-delivering the same to his 
offices in Ogden, Utah as follows: 
DATED this 
Robert D. Barclay 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
Municipal Building, First Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
day of August, 1982. 
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\ 
ASSIGNMENT OF COLLECTION OF SUPPORT PAYMENTS 
....;) Forpublica~is~ncereceivedortobereceiv~, l,_~~,~~r~1 r~1~,~~~,~~L·1~c~,~~·~~r~·<~4~:~J~o~r~L~~~~-
-~~~~1~o~C~1l~~~c~~~Ai1~1~'~~~~~~~~~~herebyassign, tranrierand set over to the Utah State 
. 
Assist~nce Payments Administration of the Department of Social Services, all monies payable to me 
and/or my child from 8 l·c«h c ) cQ i l,\ tv\.XV ::tu ,7 ci\.o CfY\.1 
(t\Mme of Absent Parent with Duty of Supporr) 
during the time I am or we are receiving public assistance and also past support and alimony due 
me, not in excess of amount due while receiving public assistance, and authorize anyone whosoever 
to deliver any and all negotiable instruments and/or warrants to be issued under the above duty of 
support to the Bureau of Recovery Services, Utah State Assistance Payments Administration, which 
is authorized to endorse my name upon and receive any and all funds due or to become due 
provided that the balance due on said claim shall be reassigned to me whenever the assignee recovers 
in full the sum equivalent to the assistance I have received. 
I further authorize said assignee to do every act and thing it deems necessary to collect the 
support and/or alimony payments, including taking any and all legal action it deems necessary or 
the compromising of my or our claims without further notice to me. 
Dated this r2 ~ Day of ~)Jo.a r J, , 19 / 5 . • 
Signature: ::ru Ct y I Y\ e ,/. :yt1 cc h Cr J"\.;)V 
(Applicant or Recipient} 
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APPENDIX B 
KELLY G. CARDON, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2506 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 627-0400 
-. ' -... 
. . ,.. .. ~ . 
... ,. 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
GOLDIE KNUDSON I 
Plaintiff, MOTION FOR ORDER 
vs. TO SHOW CAUSE 
L. CRAIG KNUDSON, 
Civil No. 71529 
Defendant. ~-d 
_../ _!{i 
Plaintiff moves the Court for an Order directed to 
Defendant, requiring him to appear personally before t~e Court at 
a time and place certain and show cause, if-any he may have, why 
he should not be required to pay to Plaintiff such sums as may be 
found reasonable for temporary alimony and child support_ money, 
and temporary attorney's fees during the pendency of these pro-
ceedings; why Plaintiff should not be awarded the temporary and 
exclusive use and possession of the mobile home jointly owned by 
the parties as a residence for herself and the minor ~hild ROBERT 
CRAIG KNUDSON; and why temporary custody of said minor child 
should not be awarded to Plaintiff, subject to reasonable visita-
tion by Defendant. I 
Plaintiff further requests that said Order ~o·show Cause II 
require Defendant to produce at said hearing a sta~ement ~f his 
I 
total income for the year 1978 and the month of January, l979, and-! 
! 
a statement from his employer setting forth his current rate of I 
pay and his salary, with deductions, during his ~ost recent ?aY 
j · period. 
I 
I 
I 
I This Motion is ~ade and based upon the papers ~~d 
pleadings filed herein and for the reasons more specifically set 
-1-
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forth in Plaintiff's sworn Affidavit annexed hereto and made a 
part hereof. 
DATED AND SIGNED at Ogden, Weber County, Utah this 
day of 
-----------------' 1979. 
-29-
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KELLY G. CARDON, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
I 
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